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Reference Group Behaviour and Economic Incentives: 
A Further Remark* 
The argument given in SCHLICHT [1981] can be generalized to the case of 
heterogeneous individuals. 
Assume n workers forming a reference group. Denote actual productivity of 
a given worker by ni and his reference productivity by a:. In presence of an 
economic incentive e, the i-th worker determines his productivity according to 
where fl denotes the partial derivative of f(.) with respect to the first 
argument, etc. 
Reference productivity x: follows the observed average productivity of the 
other workers which is perceived as 
Hence the process (4) in SCALICHT [l98l] is replaced by the system of 
differential equations1 
The equilibrium values of n*=(x:, ...,n,*) for given r are defined by the 
conditions 
This gives rise to the following proposition: 
Ifthere exists a set of equilibrium aspiration levels E* = (ri:, .. . I?,*) satisfying (4), it 
is unique and globally stable. 
* This note has been written in response to one of several points of criticism of 
SCHLICHT [I9811 by R. Cremer. 
' Due to a printing error, the dot over k* on the left-hand side of (4) in SCHLICHT 
[I9811 has been omitted. 
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Proof: 
1. (Uniqueness) It is easy to check that the Jacobian of system (3) has a 
dominant diagonal. This establishes uniqueness, see NIKAIDO 119681, theorems 
21.1 and 20.4. 
2. (Global stability) Define 
as functions of n*, and consider the Ljapunov function2 
(6) v = max 1 ~ ~ 1  . 
i 
It is to be shown that this function is decreasing over time. For a given state IC*, 
let vs ( l ,2 ,  ...., n} denote the index which maximizes the expression in (6) during 
the next instant (v need not be unique). Hence we have V=IA,.I and the time 
derivative 
Since 
(8) 
and since IA,1 21Aj l ,  f', 1 1 for all j, this implies A. < 0 for A,> 0 and A, > 0 
for A,cO. 
Hence is negative whenever it is defined. 
Since V is a continuous function which is piecewise continuously differentia- 
ble, the above argument is sufficient to establish the proposition that V is 
strictly decreasing over time. This proves stability. 
The impact of a change of the economic incentive e on equilibrium 
productivity can be calculated by noting that (4) implies 
i.e. that the average aspiration level and the average productivity are equal in 
equilibrium. Hence average productivity rS can be identified with the average 
aspiration level 
Formula (4) can be re-written now as 
n 
.; =-. 1 lz- -.f'(rS,',e) . 
n-1 n-1 
On the Ljapunov technique, see BHATIA and SZEW [1970], theorem 2.2, p. 66. 
13714 (198 1 )  Reference Group Behaviour 735 
This can be differentiated and solved for dliF/de. Summation with respect to i 
yields 
(12) dli n n . -  = dlS 
- 
f 2  
'--? n-1  +jil de T n - l + f l  de 
Solving for d%/de gives the desired expression describing the impact of the 
economic incentive on productivity 
dli 
- = C ai .fl 
de j 
where 
(14) 1 1 
It is easy to see that a, is close to l / n  if social interdependence is weak (f'; 
close tb zero for all j) and that it tends to infinity if social interdependence is 
strong (f'; close to unity for all j). Furthermore, each ai is strictly increasing if 
f{ increases for one j. Hence, if one individual changes in such a way that his 
reference productivity becomes more important for him, this will increase the 
social productivity effect for all other individuals. 
Formula (13) is the analogue to (6) in SCHLICHT [1981]. The associated 
"social multiplier" can be defined as 
C air', 
I t  gives the productivity increase induced by a "direct" productivity increase of 
unity. This term will be particularily large if reference group behaviour is 
important, i.e. if fl is close to unity for many individuals. In this respect, the 
proposition of the earlier paper remains valid. 
The same can be said with regard to the relationship between the speed of the 
approach to equilibrium and the strength of the social multiplier: If all f{ were 
equal to unity, the eigenvalues of the Jacobian of system (3) would be all equal 
to zero. Hence the speed of adjustment in any direction would be zero. Since the 
eigenvalues are continuous functions of the matrix elements, it can be con- 
cluded that the speed of adjustment will be slow, and the social multiplier will 
be large, if reference group behaviour is important. 
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